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Abstract
This paper analyses the role of transfer payments and strategic con-
tracting within two-person strategic form games with monetary pay-
oﬀs. First, it introduces the notion of transfer equilibrium as a strat-
egy combination for which individual stability can be supported by
allowing the possibility of transfers of the induced payoﬀs. Clearly,
Nash equilibria are transfer equilibria, but under common regularity
conditions the reverse is also true. This result typically does not hold
for ﬁnite games without the possibility of randomisation, and transfer
equilibria for this particular class are studied in some detail.
The second part of the paper introduces, also within the setting of
ﬁnite games, contracting on monetary transfers as an explicit strategic
option, resulting in an associated two-stage contract game. In the ﬁrst
stage of the contract game each player has the option of proposing
transfer schemes for an arbitrary collection of outcomes. Only if the
players fully agree on the entire set of transfer proposals, the payoﬀs
of the game to be played in the second stage are modiﬁed accordingly.
The main results provide explicit characterisations of the sets of payoﬀ
vectors that are supported by Nash equilibrium and virtual subgame
perfect equilibrium, respectively.
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11 Introduction
This paper investigates the role of allowing certain aspects of commitment
and cooperation within the framework of strategic form games. More in
particular, it focuses on the explicit strategic option of costless contracting
on monetary transfer schemes with respect to particular outcomes.
Closely related to the current paper are the papers of Jackson and Wilkie
(2005) and Yamada (2003). Basically both of these papers allow for a rather
broad type of contracts within a setting of mixed extensions of ﬁnite strategic
form games. In this setting contracts on transfer payments are contingent on
the actual choice of speciﬁc strategies. Jackson and Wilkie (2005) illustrate
that this type of costless contracting does not necessarily lead to eﬃciency.
Yamada (2003) explicitly models the described format of contracting as a
strategic option in a two-stage extensive form game and derives a kind a
Folk theorem: the payoﬀ conﬁgurations supported by subgame perfect Nash
equilibria of this two-stage contract game are characterised.
The objective of the current paper is to analyse contracts on transfer
payments of only the simplest form. The contracting will be contingent on
the actual occurrence of outcomes, so only on the realisation of strategy
combinations and not on the actual choice of individual strategies. This
lowers the degree of sophistication required in the cooperative commitments.
In particular, it avoids intrinsic problems regarding the non-perceptibility
of mixed strategies. Moreover, the two-stage contract game in the current
paper allows only for a unanimity type of contracting on sets of outcomes. By
restricting to this type of basic contracting and combining this with the more
appropriate concept of virtual subgame perfection as introduced by Garc´ ıa-
Jurado and Gonzalez-D´ ıaz (2006), Yamada’s Folk theorem is recovered.
Although the concepts and results in this paper can be readily extended
to games with more players, we restrict our attention to two-player games
for expositional purposes.
The ﬁrst part of the paper deals with the possibility of making a speciﬁc
strategy combination individually stable by having a simple monetary trans-
fer scheme contingent on the actual realisation of the corresponding outcome.
2Such a strategy combination is called a transfer equilibrium. Under standard
regularity conditions however (which for example are satisﬁed for any mixed
extension of a ﬁnite game) it turns out that the set of transfer equilibria coin-
cides with the set of Nash equilibria. For ﬁnite games without the possibility
of randomisation, the set of Nash equilibria can be a strict subset of the set
of transfer equilibria. This particular subclass is analysed in some detail.
The second and larger part of the paper models contracting on monetary
transfers as an explicit strategic option within a two-stage extensive form
setting. The ﬁrst stage consists of the contracting stage where both players
can propose transfer schemes as before but now possibly on multiple outcomes
simultaneously. Only if both players fully agree on all transfer proposals
(”give or take”), the payoﬀs of the original game are modiﬁed accordingly
and the modiﬁed game is played in the second stage. So both the type
of contract proposals and the subsequent implementation mechanism of the
proposals are as simple as possible. It is important to note that in this setting
implemented contracts on transfer schemes with respect to certain outcomes
may lead to the rise of equilibria at outcomes that are not speciﬁed in the
contracts.
The ﬁrst main result is a full characterisation of all equilibrium payoﬀ
vectors in the same spirit as the well-known Folk theorems in the context
of repeated games. It turns out that exactly those payoﬀ vectors that are
bounded from below by the individual minimax payoﬀs and for which the
total sum of the payoﬀs is bounded from above by the maximum of the to-
tal payoﬀs over all outcomes, correspond to Nash equilibria of the two-stage
contract game. After arguing that the set of subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria (cf. Selten (1965)) of the contract game is empty because of the non-
existence of equilibria in seemingly irrelevant subgames, we focus attention
on the notion of virtual subgame perfect equilibrium (cf. Garc´ ıa-Jurado and
Gonzalez-D´ ıaz (2006)). This notion seems especially relevant and suitable in
our framework. Roughly speaking, virtual subgame perfection requires play-
ers to play best responses only in subgames close to the equilibrium path.
The second main result states that exactly those payoﬀ vectors that are in-
dividually bounded from below by some equilibrium payoﬀ, and for which
3there is a similar upper bound as in the case of Nash equilibria, correspond
to virtual subgame perfect equilibria of the contract game.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 analyses the possibility of
contracting on monetary transfer with respect to one particular outcome and
investigates the corresponding notion of transfer equilibrium. In Section 3
the two-stage contract game that allows for strategic contracting on sets of
outcomes is formally introduced and explained. Section 4 states and proves
the Folk-like theorems with respect to Nash equilibria and virtual subgame
perfect equilibria of the contract game.
2 Transfer equilibria
A two-player strategic game is a quartet G = (X1,X2,H1,H2), where Xi
denotes the strategy set of player i ∈ {1,2} and Hi : X → R is his payoﬀ
function, assigning to each strategy proﬁle x = (x1,x2) ∈ X (with X =
X1 × X2) a payoﬀ Hi(x). In our framework we allow for certain transfers of
payoﬀ from one player to the other, so we assume the payoﬀs to be monetary.
A Nash equilibrium of G is a strategy proﬁle x ∈ X such that Hi(x) ≥
Hi(x′
i,x−i) for all x′
i ∈ Xi and i ∈ {1,2}. A Nash equilibrium is usually
predicted as the outcome of a game when players are not able to make binding
agreements on their strategy choices, but they are allowed to communicate
before play starts.
In this paper, we allow the players to cooperate in a limited way. We as-
sume that they have a mechanism which allows them to make an enforceable
commitment before play starts on a transfer of money after both players
have chosen their pre-speciﬁed strategy. So, players can agree to commit
themselves to any reallocation of H1(x)+H2(x), conditional on the outcome
x ∈ X.
Both players also have the option not to cooperate in this way.5 So, we
have to make a distinction between the two possible partitions of the player
set. This collection of partitions is denoted by P = {{{1},{2}},{{1,2}}}.
5Note that if there are more players, we also should allow for partial cooperation, which
naturally leads to a partition of the player set into cooperating components.
4Deﬁnition 2.1 A transfer equilibrium of G is a strategy combination x ∈ X







Hi(x) for all S ∈ P, (2.1)
ii) yi ≥ Hi(x
′
i,x−i) for all i ∈ N and all x
′
i ∈ Xi \ {xi}. (2.2)
The concept of transfer equilibrium is a generalisation of the concept of Nash
equilibrium, as is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2 Each Nash equilibrium is a transfer equilibrium.
Note that the reverse of this lemma also holds for any transfer equilibrium x
that is supported by (y,P) = (H(x),{{1},{2}}).
The following proposition shows that if G satisﬁes some regularity condi-
tions, all transfer equilibria correspond to Nash equilibria.
Proposition 2.3 Let X1 and X2 be convex subsets of ﬁnite-dimensional Eu-
clidean spaces and let H1 and H2 be continuous. Then x is a Nash equilibrium
of G if and only if x is a transfer equilibrium of G.
Proof: In view of Lemma 2.2, we only have to show the “if” part. Suppose
that x is a transfer equilibrium and assume that both X1 and X2 have more
than one element (otherwise the proof is more straightforward). Let i ∈ {1,2}
and let ε > 0. Let x′
i ∈ Xi\{xi} be such that |Hi(x)−Hi(x′
i,x−i)| < ε. Note
that such an x′
i always exists because Xi is a convex subset of an Euclidean
space and Hi is continuous. Then (2.2) implies that yi ≥ Hi(x) − ε. Since
this holds for every ε > 0, (2.1) implies that yi = Hi(x) for all i ∈ {1,2}.
Thus (2.2) implies that x is a Nash equilibrium of G. ￿
Given Proposition 2.3, we restrict our attention to games that do not satisfy
the regularity conditions mentioned there. In particular, we consider games
with a ﬁnite number of strategies. A ﬁnite two-player game is a quartet
G = (M,N,H1,H2), where M = {1,...,m} and N = {1,...,n} are the
strategy sets of player 1 and 2, respectively. G is usually denoted by a
5pair of payoﬀ matrices (A,B), where A = (aij = H1(i,j))(i,j)∈M×N and
B = (bij = H2(i,j))(i,j)∈M×N.
The following examples illustrate the concept of transfer equilibria for
ﬁnite two-player games. The ﬁrst example is a prisoners’ dilemma and shows
that in such a game, the set of transfer equilibria may contain elements that
are not Nash equilibria.








Using Lemma 2.2, it is immediately clear that (B,R) is a transfer equilibrium
(with y = H(x) and P = {{1},{2}}). Furthermore, (B,R) is also supported
as a transfer equilibrium by {((x,2 − x),{{1,2}}) |x ∈ [0,2]}. The other
transfer equilibria are (B,L), with {((x,5 − x),{{1,2}}) |x ∈ [3,4]}, and
the mirror image (T,R) with {((x,5 − x),{{1,2}}) |x ∈ [1,2]}.
Note that the concept of transfer equilibria is diﬀerent from full coopera-
tion, as in that case the players would play (T,L) and divide a total amount
of 6 between them. This is, however, impossible as for any transfer of money
in that cell, at least one player has an incentive to deviate. ⊳
In the approach of Jackson and Wilkie (2005), the game in Example 2.1 does
not have an equilibrium (not even (B,R)). Because of the way they set up
their transfer proposals, mixing has to be allowed to sustain any equilibrium
in this particular game.
The next example, known as matching pennies, demonstrates that the
set of transfer equilibria can be non-empty even when there are no Nash
equilibria.








6It is obvious that the set of Nash equilibria of this game is empty. However,
(T,L) supported by ((0,2),{{1,2}}) is a transfer equilibrium. In fact any
combination of strategies gives rise to a transfer equilibrium in an analogous
way. ⊳
Although the set of transfer equilibria is an extension of the set of Nash
equilibria, not all games have transfer equilibria.












For none of the strategy combinations it is possible to transfer money in such
a way that both players have no incentive to deviate. Therefore, this game
has no transfer equilibria. ⊳
Non-existence of a transfer equilibrium in Example 2.3 follows from the fol-
lowing proposition, which provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a
transfer equilibrium in a ﬁnite two-player game to exist.
Proposition 2.4 Let (A,B) be a ﬁnite two-player game. Strategy proﬁle
(r,s) ∈ M × N is a transfer equilibrium of (A,B) if and only if












Proof: “If”. Let (r,s) ∈ M ×N be such that (2.3) holds. If both ars ≥ ar
Is
and brs ≥ bs
rJ hold, then (r,s) is a Nash equilibrium and the result follows
from Lemma 2.2. Otherwise, assume without loss of generality that ars > ar
Is
and brs < bs
rJ. We construct a transfer equilibrium x supported by (y,P) by
deﬁning x = (r,s), y1 = ar
Is, y2 = brs + ars − ar
Is and P = {{1,2}}. Clearly
7y1 + y2 = ars + brs = H1(x) + H2(x), so (2.1) holds. For (2.2), y1 ≥ ais for
every i ∈ M \ {r} and











for every j ∈ N \ {s}.
“Only if”. Let (r,s) ∈ M × N, supported by ((y1,y2),P) ∈ R2 × P be a
transfer equilibrium of (A,B). If (r,s) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B) then
ars ≥ ar
Is and brs ≥ bs
rJ, from which the assertion follows immediately. If
(r,s) is not a Nash equilibrium of (A,B), then P = {{1,2}}, otherwise (2.2)
fails for at least one of the players. (2.1) and (2.2) then give y1+y2 = ars+brs
and y1 ≥ ar
Is, y2 ≥ bs
rJ. Hence, ars + brs ≥ ar
Is + bs
rJ. ￿
One consequence of Proposition 2.4 is that for any game with m ≤ 2 and
n ≤ 2, the set of transfer equilibria is non-empty. Proposition 2.4 also
implies that if there exists a transfer equilibrium (r,s) of (A,B), then ars
is the maximum in column s of the matrix A or brs is the maximum in row
r of matrix B. So, when looking for a transfer equilibrium, only the cells
containing those maxima should be considered, which means that only m+n
checks are needed.
3 Strategic transfer contracts
In the setup of transfer equilibria as discussed in the previous section, the
players have a mechanism to enforce certain commitments between them.
This mechanism can be seen as a type of contract in order to transfer money
between the players that is executed in case a particular strategy proﬁle is
played. By looking at the mechanism from that perspective one could how-
ever argue that the contracting possibilities of the players are quite limited.
First of all players are only allowed to sign a single contract and secondly, it
is required that the combination of the contract itself and the strategy proﬁle
on which it is enforced, constitutes an equilibrium.
In order to overcome these limitations we introduce for the class of two-
player ﬁnite games a diﬀerent and more sophisticated contracting model in
this section. We assume that before playing the game, the players know which
8particular allocations of earnings are available. Then each player proposes
a set of contracts. A single contract describes for one particular strategy
combination a reallocation of the corresponding payoﬀs. We speciﬁcally allow
the players to propose contracts that discard money. Only in case both
players agree on the entire contract proposal, the game is modiﬁed according
to the contract conditions.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let (A,B) be a ﬁnite two-player game. We deﬁne a transfer
contract as a pair ((r,s),(y1,y2)) ∈ M ×N ×R2 such that y1+y2 ≤ ars+brs.
Using these transfer contracts, the players play the two-stage game described
as follows.
First stage. Each player i chooses a collection of transfer con-
tracts αi ⊂ M × N × R2, at most one for each strategy proﬁle.
The choices are made simultaneously and independently. After
both players have made their choice, the proposed contracts are
publicly announced.
Second stage. If both players have chosen the same set of transfer
contracts in the ﬁrst stage, this set is adopted, the payoﬀs of the
game are modiﬁed accordingly and the players play this modiﬁed
game. If the proposed contracts in the ﬁrst stage do not match,
the original game (A,B) is played.
We want to point out once more that contracts only come into eﬀect in
case both sets of proposed contracts coincide completely. It is therefore not
possible that only part of the proposed contracts are enforced. This seems
quite natural, as the preference of a player for a set of contracts does not
automatically imply that he is also interested in any subset of these contracts.
The main diﬀerence between this model and the setup in Section 2 is that
here contracts are a strategic option, as they can be signed on every cell and
are not necessarily located at an equilibrium of the ensuing second stage. In
particular, it is possible that a contract on one cell results in an equilibrium
at another cell.
9The contract game as described above can be represented by an extensive





2), where for each player i a strategy is a pair
(αi,fi) ∈ Xc
i with αi a collection of transfer contracts and fi a map which
assigns an action fi(¯ α) ∈ Xi to every pair ¯ α = (¯ α1, ¯ α2) of contract proposals.





yi if α1 = α2 and (f(α),y) ∈ αi,
Hi(f(α)) otherwise.
Let us now consider the three examples discussed in Section 2. For the
prisoners’ dilemma of Example 2.1, the combination of strategies in which
both players propose a set of contracts such that the cells (T,R) and (B,L)
are replaced by (0,0) constitutes, in combination with player 1 (2) playing
T (L) if both players choose these contracts and B (R) otherwise, a Nash
equilibrium of the game Γc(A,B). Formally, this equilibrium strategy proﬁle
(ˆ α, ˆ f) is given by
ˆ α1 = ˆ α2 ={((T,R),(0,0)),((B,L),(0,0))},
ˆ f1(α) =
 




L if α = ˆ α,
R otherwise.
It is clear that unilaterally deviating will not lead to a higher payoﬀ: player i’s
best response is to play according to ˆ fi in the second stage in case both
players have played according to ˆ α in the ﬁrst stage, and in case player i has
deviated in the ﬁrst stage. In the latter situation the second stage consists
of the original prisoners’ dilemma game.
For the matching pennies in Example 2.2, we established that for instance
(T,L), supported by ((0,2),{1,2})is a transfer equilibrium. However, Γc(A,B)
does not have a Nash equilibrium with associated payoﬀ vector (0,2), as this
outcome is only reachable if both players agree on a set of contracts. In
that case, however, player 1 will deviate from (α,f) by choosing ¯ α1 = ∅ in
6We model extensive form games as in Kreps and Wilson (1982).
10combination with a best response to f2(¯ α1,α2), leading to a payoﬀ equal to
2.
As a matter of fact, with a similar reasoning one can show that for match-
ing pennies the contract game has no Nash equilibria at all. This is not a
consequence of the game being constant-sum (as can be seen by replacing the
(T,L) payoﬀs by (3,0), in which case the same arguments hold), but relates
to the minimax payoﬀs of both players. In Section 4 we elaborate on this
point.
The game of Example 2.3 does not have any transfer equilibria. The corre-
sponding contract game Γc(A,B), however, does possess a Nash equilibrium.
Consider for instance the strategy combination in which both players pro-
pose a set of contracts such that all cells except (T,L) are replaced by (0,0).
Furthermore, player 1 chooses T if this set of contracts is executed and B
otherwise, and player 2 plays L regardless of the contract choice. Then unilat-
erally deviating will not lead to a higher payoﬀ and hence, this combination
of strategies is a Nash equilibrium in the contract game.
4 Folk theorems
In this section we analyse the equilibrium payoﬀs of a contract game. We
provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a payoﬀ vector to be the result
of some Nash equilibrium of this two-stage game. Moreover, we give a similar
result for an equilibrium reﬁnement that appears natural in this context,
called virtual subgame perfect equilibrium.











Theorem 4.1 Let (A,B) be a two-player ﬁnite game with minimax payoﬀ
vector v. For every z ≥ v such that z1 +z2 ≤ ars +brs for some (r,s) ∈ M ×
N there exists a Nash equilibrium of the game Gc(A,B) with corresponding
payoﬀ vector z.
11Proof: Let z ≥ v and (¯ r, ¯ s) ∈ M × N be such that z1 + z2 ≤ a¯ r¯ s + b¯ r¯ s. Let
(˜ r, ˜ s) ∈ M × N be such that
max
s∈N
b˜ rs = v2 and max
r∈M
ar˜ s = v1.
We construct a Nash equilibrium (ˆ α, ˆ f) of the game Gc(A,B) as follows. For
each player i ∈ {1,2}, the set of transfer contracts is given by
ˆ αi =
 








 (r,s) ∈ (M × N) \ {(¯ r, ¯ s)}
 
,
where p ∈ R2 is such that p < v and p1 + p2 ≤ ars + brs for all (r,s) ∈
(M × N) \ {(¯ r, ¯ s)}. The strategies in the second stage are given for all α by
ˆ f1(α) =
 
¯ r if α = ˆ α,
˜ r if α  = ˆ α,
ˆ f2(α) =
 
¯ s if α = ˆ α,
˜ s if α  = ˆ α.
Clearly, H(ˆ α, ˆ f) = z. If player 1 chooses (α1,f1), then his payoﬀ equals




z1 if α1 = ˆ α1, f1(α1, ˆ α2) = ¯ r,
p1 if α1 = ˆ α1, f1(α1, ˆ α2)  = ¯ r,
H1(f1(α1, ˆ α2), ˜ s) if α1  = ˆ α1.
Given the choice of p1 and ˜ s,
H1((α1, ˆ α2),(f1, ˆ f2)) ≤ z1 = H1(ˆ α, ˆ f).
Similarly, player 2 has no incentive to deviate and (ˆ α, ˆ f) is a Nash equilibrium
of Gc(A,B). ￿
Note that the condition on the payoﬀ vector z in Theorem 4.1 is not only
suﬃcient, but also necessary. If zi < vi for some player i ∈ {1,2}, then z is
not an equilibrium payoﬀ in the contract game, since player i will deviate by
proposing no contract and playing his minimax strategy in the second stage.
Theorem 4.1 states that every feasible payoﬀ vector larger than the min-
imax payoﬀ vector of (A,B) is supported as the payoﬀ of some Nash equi-
librium of the contract game Γc(A,B). However, the equilibrium strategy
12proﬁle constructed in the proof may prescribe unreasonable strategy choices
in subgames oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Consider for instance the game of Example 2.3, and the Nash equilibrium
(ˆ α, ˆ f) of the corresponding contract game Γc(A,B) presented at the end of
Section 3. In this game, v = (6,5) and (ˆ α, ˆ f) is one of the Nash equilibria
constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.1 with (¯ r, ¯ s) = (T,L), z = (6,6),
p = (0,0), ˜ r = B and ˜ s = L. The problem with this Nash equilibrium is that
after any unilateral deviation from the proposed contract set the players end
up in a subgame in which the original game (A,B) is played in the second
stage, and in that game B is not a best response to L.
In order to deal with this shortcoming, one might consider subgame per-
fect equilibria of Γc(A,B) (cf. Selten (1965)). A Nash equilibrium is called
subgame perfect if it prescribes a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
However, the set of subgame perfect equilibria in the contract game is
always empty (if m,n ≥ 2). Consider the subgame starting at the node where
both players have proposed the same collection of contracts in such a way
that the modiﬁed game in the second stage possesses no Nash equilibrium
(notice that this can easily be done). Clearly, any proposed strategy in
Γc(A,B) does not prescribe a Nash equilibrium in this subgame and hence,
no subgame perfect equilibrium exists.
The problem with the concept of subgame perfection in this particular
model is that the game has too many subgames, some of which seem not
particularly relevant. To tackle this problem, Garc´ ıa-Jurado and Gonzalez-
D´ ıaz (2006) introduced the concept of virtually subgame perfect equilibrium.
For a strategy proﬁle σ in an extensive form game Γ to be a virtually subgame
perfect equilibrium, it must prescribe a Nash equilibrium in the σ-relevant
subgames of Γ. A subgame of Γ is called σ-relevant if it is Γ itself or if it
starts at a node that can be reached from a σ-relevant subgame by at most
one unilateral deviation from σ.
Let us once more consider the contract game corresponding to the game of
Example 2.3. In the Nash equilibrium presented before, both players propose
a set of contracts in which all cells except (T,L) are replaced by (0,0). Then
given these contract choices, all σ-relevant subgames correspond to the second
13stage play of either the game in which all these contracts are executed, or the
original game (A,B). This is due to the fact that if only one player deviates
from his contract proposal the sets of proposed contracts do not match, in
which case the original game (A,B) is played in the second stage. In order to
end up in a diﬀerent game in the second stage, both players have to deviate
from the equilibrium strategy proﬁle, which means that such a subgame is
not σ-relevant.
Hence, a particular strategy proﬁle can only be a virtually subgame per-
fect equilibrium if it results in a Nash equilibrium in the original game (A,B)
for each subgame in which the players are called to play this game. Such a
strategy proﬁle obviously does not exist in the game of Example 2.3 as the
subgames in which (A,B) is played in the second stage do not possess a Nash
equilibrium.
Next, consider the prisoners’ dilemma in Example 2.1 and the equilib-
rium strategy proﬁle proposed in Section 3 for the corresponding contract
game. Then we see that this strategy proﬁle leads to a Nash equilibrium in
all subgames in which (A,B) is played. Furthermore, it also constitutes a
Nash equilibrium in the subgame in which the proposed contract set comes
into eﬀect. Therefore, this strategy proﬁle is a virtually subgame perfect
equilibrium.
These two examples indicate that there is a strong relation between the
existence of Nash equilibria in the game (A,B) on the one hand and the ex-
istence of virtually subgame perfect equilibria in the contract game Γc(A,B)
on the other. The next theorem formalises this result.
Theorem 4.2 Let (A,B) be a two-player ﬁnite game. For every z ∈ R2 such
that for every i ∈ {1,2} there exists a Nash equilibrium (ri,si) of (A,B) with
zi ≥ Hi(ri,si) and such that z1+z2 ≤ ars+brs for some (r,s) ∈ M×N, there
exists a virtually subgame perfect equilibrium of Γc(A,B) with corresponding
payoﬀ vector z.
Proof: Let z, (r1,s1) and (r2,s2) be as stated in the theorem and let
(¯ r, ¯ s) ∈ M ×N be such that z1+z2 ≤ H1(¯ r, ¯ s)+H2(¯ r, ¯ s). Deﬁne the strategy
14proﬁle (ˆ α, ˆ f) as follows. For each i ∈ {1,2},




   
 (r,s) ∈ (M × N) \ {(¯ r, ¯ s)}
 
,
where p ∈ R2 is such that p < v (the minimax payoﬀ vector) and p1 + p2 ≤
ars +brs for all (r,s) ∈ (M ×N)\{(¯ r, ¯ s)}. The strategies in the second stage





(¯ r, ¯ s) if α = ˆ α,
(r1,s1) if α1  = ˆ α1,α2 = ˆ α2,
(r2,s2) if α1 = ˆ α1,α2  = ˆ α2,
(r∗,s∗) otherwise,
where (r∗,s∗) is an arbitrary strategy proﬁle of (A,B).
Obviously, H(ˆ α, ˆ f) = z. We check that (ˆ α, ˆ f) is a virtually subgame perfect
equilibrium of Γc(A,B). First, in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 4.1,
one can show that (ˆ α, ˆ f) is a Nash equilibrium of Gc(A,B).
The nodes which deﬁne a subgame (apart from the root) are the nodes
corresponding to each proﬁle of transfer contract collections (α1,α2). Of
these, only the proﬁles reachable from unilateral deviations in the ﬁrst stage,
(ˆ α1,α2) and (α1, ˆ α2) give rise to (ˆ α, ˆ f)-relevant subgames.
Consider the subgame in which player 1 has chosen α1  = ˆ α1 in the ﬁrst
stage. In this subgame, ˆ f prescribes (r1,s1), which is a Nash equilibrium in
this subgame, because no contract is enforced. Similarly, ˆ f prescribes a Nash
equilibrium in every (ˆ α, ˆ f)-relevant subgame in which player 2 has deviated.
Hence, (ˆ α, ˆ f) is a virtually subgame perfect equilibrium. ￿
Again, the conditions on the payoﬀ vector z are necessary. For a strategy
proﬁle of Γc(A,B) to be virtually subgame perfect, it has to prescribe a Nash
equilibrium in the second stage in which the original game (A,B) is played,
since this is always a relevant subgame. If, say, H1(r,s) > z1 for each Nash
equilibrium (r,s) of (A,B), then player 1 has an incentive to deviate and
propose no contract.
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